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North Korea: The War Game

We will contact you if necessary. To learn more about Copies Direct watch this short online video. How do I find a book? Can I borrow this item? Can I get a copy? Can I view this online? Polak A review of 16 planning and forecast methodologies used in U. Army Corps of Engineers inland navigatio Members of Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander and Maori communities are advised that this catalogue contains names and images of deceased people.

Uncharacteristic adulthood prevailed and that i resisted the temptation, yet i used to be struck via the underlying statement that learn at the str- ture and serve as of tropomyosin has been a little bit invisible, really when it comes to the cytoskeleton isoforms. Groundwater in rural development: Within these bounds, the players were free to take any decisions they chose.

Such capabilities would insure the ability of the U. So conjure me up an aerial lift vehicle that can transport such a load:. It formally recognized the importance of Army Transformation producing a force that could conduct vertical envelopments, noting " Objective Force systems support dominant maneuver — horizontal and vertical, day and night — in all weather and terrain as dismounted or mounted combined arms teams with unyielding unit integrity. The concept for the Objective Force calls for U.

This deep battle doctrine seeks to limit the freedom of action of the opposing commander and to disrupt his operational coherence and tempo. Despite their significant range, accuracy, and lethality, often these systems only disrupt rather than destroy their targets. Traditional countermeasures such as camouflage and decoys, combined with intelligent use of restrictive terrain like cities and jungles, have degraded sensor performance. During Operation Desert Storm ODS , Coalition aircraft had to mount repeated attacks against many strategic targets because of their inability to destroy them or hostile damage repair capabilities.

During the days of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in , 10, strike sorties produced similar controversial results. A post-conflict assessment by the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team found that air strikes hit mobile targets destroying 26 tank-like vehicles 14 tanks and 12 self-propelled artillery pieces , 17 armored personnel carriers, and 20 artillery pieces , rather than the 1, reported. The final NATO assessment claimed successful strikes against 93 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces.

Presumably, the Serbs recovered or salvaged the difference. Plainly, sensors must improve before air strikes can independently achieve the rapid decisive results imagined by some advocates. The performance expected of near-term sensors will limit American situational awareness. To succeed, the FCS must possess inherent survivability that counters those threats likely to remain undetected. However, discriminating vehicles from three-dimensional decoys would remain an issue.

Even if prospective opponents cannot effectively counter U. Furthermore, NVESD does not expect that emerging sensor systems will discriminate between dismounted threats and civilians, especially when opponents dresses like civilians or operate in restricted terrain as happened in Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq.

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Although NVESD expects to resolve issues involving bandwidth and airspace management, the Army must balance their sensor capabilities how much, how often, and how detailed against deployability. NVESD expects support units to remain vulnerable as they will lack the level of situational awareness of combat forces. Additionally, ROEs Rules of Engagement that prevent Objective Force units from engaging until an enemy displays hostile intent would degrade any advantages America possesses in situational awareness by permitting him the first shot.

Based on these limitations, the following technologies may help to counter likely residual threats those which survive American standoff fires: The " virtual presence " of such a capability should force opponents to reallocate significant combat resources away from the MBA Main Battle Area.

A similar effect appeared during ODS when the Iraqi Army deployed along the Kuwaiti coast to counter the threat posed by a marine amphibious assault that never came. This capability will also have significant deterrent effects by placing potential opponents in the impossible strategic position of having more dispersed assets to defend than they have forces. If he concentrates to counter a ground attack, this will result in more lucrative high-payoff targets for air strikes.

As shown in Vietnam, Somalia, and recently in Iraq, these constitute a critical vulnerability for the U. In the 20 th century, militaries used four major technologies to conduct vertical envelopments: These seemingly modern developments have a long history. While the game became less martial in outward appearance as it spread to Persia, China, and Europe, military men seem not to have been distracted by queens and bishops.

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The game provided mental training for commanders ranging from William the Conqueror to Tamerlane. However, traditional chess, even when played with chariots and elephants, had obvious differences from battle. The opposing armies of chessmen were completely identical and the terrain was perfectly uniform, making the conflict artificially symmetrical. Both sides also had total knowledge of the entire battlefield, including all enemy positions. Orders were implausibly orderly, carried out instantaneously as each player politely took his turn.

And there were no external factors akin to disease or storms. Chess was a closed system.

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Chaos and chance were eliminated. This level of abstraction had obvious advantages. But since strategic choices were never so stark in war, the most a commander could expect from chess was sharpened intellect, and there was always the threat that a young warrior would misunderstand what was being simulated and expect troops to obey as placidly as chess pieces.

Beginning in the 17th century, European military strategists considered ways in which to make chess conform more closely to real fighting so that chess could provide more well-rounded training. At first it was just a matter of enlarging the battlefield and making armies more varied with markers representing cavalry, artillery, and infantry. By the 18th century, the squares of the game board came to represent different kinds of terrain, either by varying their color or by transferring the grid onto a regional map. Rules were written to vary the speed at which troops advanced, based on whether they were on horse or foot, and whether they were crossing meadows or scaling mountains.

Players were responsible for rudimentary logistics, ensuring there were supply lines to keep soldiers fed. But that was just the beginning. The full transformation from chess to war games occurred in the 19th century, when a Prussian lieutenant named Georg von Reisswitz layered in aspects of a sandbox game invented by his father.

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The results of each dice throw were tallied according to real battlefield statistics, specifying the range of casualties to be expected in any given scenario. As in real warfare, neither side had total knowledge of the conflict. Each played on a separate board, with an umpire making his way back and forth. Rules derived from battlefield experience determined how much the umpire allowed each side to see of the opposition. Those rules also guided the dice-thrown results of combat. The game was known as kriegsspiel. Germany used war games to invent the blitzkrieg, Japan to occupy Pacific island outposts, and the U.

The verisimilitude of kriegsspiel impressed Karl von Muffling, the Prussian chief of staff, when Reisswitz demonstrated his game in The game would be played on a map corresponding to the surrounding landscape. Precise data for each maneuver would be collected by marching the local garrison through the formations on the game board. On this basis, Moltke not only provided training but also supplied tactical plans for the garrison in case of actual invasion. Yet as the realism of kriegsspiel increased, the rules governing it—and the effort of playing it—threatened to overwhelm war gaming.

Partly this was a practical issue: The more time required to set up and play out a scenario, the smaller the number of scenarios that could be explored. But there was also the deeper risk that greater verisimilitude would paradoxically make gameplay less relevant. It was the opposite of the issue with chess, where the lessons learned were universal yet abstract. In kriegsspiel , the lessons were often so concrete as to be sui generis.

And even if the perfect occasion arose for applying a war-gamed tactic, the complexity of kriegsspiel made it difficult to determine whether the results were biased by how the rules interacted. The umpire passed back and forth between teams, collecting orders and providing intelligence. This arrangement made the games fast like actual warfare, and the umpire knew the reason for his decisions, which meant he could help players to understand the outcome at any level of abstraction.

The game was a prelude to discussion. Games could be configured at any point along these two axes, optimized according to what the commander wished to achieve. And as war-gaming developed, expectations increased. Games could be used for training officers, building camaraderie, identifying leaders, understanding enemies, anticipating conflicts, inventing tactics, testing strategies, predicting outcomes.

In the United States, where kriegsspiel was imported in , one of the first questions was logistical. The Naval War College gamed different scenarios to determine whether fuel supplies for battleships should be shifted from coal to oil. The games indicated that a switchover would be advantageous. The Navy did it, fortuitously modernizing their fleet in time for World War I.

In Europe, kriegsspiel was widely used to develop strategies for ground war. Given Prussian tradition—and German delusions of grandeur—Germany was especially active, developing whole file cabinets of battle plans. One of the most promising played out the invasions of Holland and Belgium in order to quash the French army before the British could assist. The game determined that Germany would triumph against France as long as ammunition could be rapidly replenished. And the plan might have worked brilliantly, if the only players had been the German and French armies.

But the German kriegsspiel failed to factor in the pride of Belgian civilians, who proved ready and able saboteurs—even of their own railroads—upsetting German momentum. Even more catastrophic, the game left out diplomacy which, by way of alliances, brought America into the war—and not on the side of the Reich. The defeat of Germany in World War I suggested the need for another dimension in war games: a sociopolitical axis. Depending on the circumstances, war games needed to model the non-military implications of military actions, and to do so from the local to the global scale.

Only when all three axes were properly accounted for could a game function meaningfully. And the appropriate level of abstraction, openness, and inclusiveness were different for every situation and every purpose. A ll the major militaries gamed at multiple levels in the interwar period, with varied results. Germany successfully used war games to invent the blitzkrieg, Japan gamed the maneuvers their navy would later use to occupy Pacific island outposts, and the U.

But games delving into politics were more treacherous. In Japan, the Total War Research Institute held political-military games in that simulated the political interests and military power of countries including the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and America. The games correctly predicted a Japanese defeat of England in the Far East, incorrectly anticipated a German victory over the U.

Certainly there was no premonition of how political conditions in Nazi Germany would give America the scientific brainpower behind the Manhattan Project, ultimately leading to the atomic bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The predictive aims of the games ended in colossal failure.

However, the real problem had less to do with game mechanics or faulty data than the belief that any global interplay of cause and effect could be decisively modeled. A post-war assessment by Admiral Chester Nimitz provides some insight into the American approach. In other words, the U. The only limitation was the American military imagination, which was simply too American to conceive of Japanese suicide missions. This exploratory approach was carried forward into the Cold War, reinforced by the circumstances of nuclear armament. The fundamental problem faced by both the U. The nuclear era was entirely unprecedented, and one wrong decision could cause the end of civilization.

The purpose of this free gaming was to develop intuitions: Since a good model would need to account for everything in the world—given that nuclear war was inherently global—good models were all but unbuildable. Instead the Pentagon opted for many inadequate simulations and gave low credence to any of them. Yet inevitably American government and military leaders wanted to master the Cold War.

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They sought victory over communism. Advances in computing stoked that ambition, as did progress in game theory as a model for non-zero sum games. Robert F.

King's College London - Simulating War

Kennedy saw games as an alternative to political debate in which all interests could role-play their way to civil rights. The book attempted to establish economics as an exact science by modeling economic scenarios as multi-player games. If fighting tactics from the past could be optimized, then why not future planning for nuclear engagement?

The level of abstraction at which game theory was viable made the most compelling conclusions practically irrelevant. In that sense, it was like chess.

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At about the same time that Schelling published his book, the U. Rather the machine was a sort of electromechanical umpire, managing data and calculating dice-throws for role-playing games. Later versions had a similar function, though one side or both might be played by the computer itself, allowing the gaming process to be greatly accelerated. Countless games could be played, countless options considered, countless outcomes recorded.

If game theory was the non plus ultra of chess-like abstraction, these computerized simulations were the ultimate extreme of kriegsspiel : resolutely concrete and vulnerable to programming biases. For strategic purposes, game theory was too vague and computer simulations were too specific.

The most versatile and insightful technique remained the oldest still in use: the 19th-century free war games of Julius von Verdy du Vernois. If only they could provide more than heuristics. Legitimate skepticism about their predictive value may partly explain why gaming had so little sway over American policy in Vietnam. An early intimation of what free war games could become was suggested by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in After playing a politico-military game organized by Schelling, Kennedy inquired about gaming a resolution to racial inequality in the South: an alternative to political debate in which all interests could role-play their way to civil rights.

The idea was abandoned following President John F. As a guest of the Soviet government, Bloomfield orchestrated a simulation where Soviet, American, and Israeli officials unofficially war-gamed a hypothetical Middle East conflict akin to the Six-Day War. Bloomfield intentionally scrambled their positions. I n , a former soldier named Charles Roberts designed a simple war game for civilians.